raw-data memdumps

Exploring AutoIT FUD Crypter

29 Jul 2019

Some time ago, while reviewing old samples reports passed through MalSilo, any caught my attention, below the main triggers of one of these.

- PE32 sample
  - some generic YARA rules matches
  - + AutoIT match
  - + DarkComent match
- Persistance via schtasks.exe 
- svchost.exe connecting to exotic domain

Everything maliciously normal here, but after a quick check and some metadata quirks it turned out the specimen was packed with CypherIT.

As far as I can tell from few searches, the crypter is well advertised in forums and YouTube videos.

  • The first part of the analysis will take in consideration some of the sample’s layers, reaching its core with the RunPE (shellcode) section
  • The second one, will briefly map CypherIT website advertised features to its code components
  • The third section explores more packed malware, and their final payload thanks to MalSilo’s backends (one of which is MISP)
  • Finally yet importantly, we will have a look to a recent sample

Let’s start peeling …

Technical details of the sample are given below

First seen (MalSilo): 2018-11-28
File name: K2bkm.jpg
drop site: https[:]//f.coka[.]la/K2bkm.jpg
md5: 7ece8890e1e797843d68e73eb0ac2bc4
sha1: 4448b907f2c9f9ee8e4b13e4b6c292eef4b70930
sha256: 84d0c9352eacf92a919f972802a6a7949664f204f984aaf4b44da1b1aa7aa729
ssdeep: 24576:Fu6J33O0c+JY5UZ+XC0kGso6FapiE6kitdnsxWY:Hu0c++OCvkGs9FaeFY

Process execution flow

Behavior Graph

Pstree view

Detailed view

    \_ (copy of) sample.exe
    \_ schtasks.exe 1368 /create /tn 5265676973747279204B6579204E616D65 /tr "C:\Users\[..]\AppData\Local\Temp\Folder Name\winint.exe" /sc minute /mo 1 /F

I - Runtime behaviour

In a nutshell, the following steps are executed by the program

  1. sample.exe runs a basic anti-analysis check
    1. AutoIT script body gets executed
  2. AutoIT code:
    1. Start execution logic
      1. Remove Zone.Identifier
      2. Create mutex
      3. Sleep
      4. Runs decryption routine on one embedded PE resource
      5. Executes RunPE (via shellcode), in this case, self-process hollowing
      6. Install persistance task
  3. Final payload (for this sample, DarkComet) does its dirty job

Layer 1

In order to avoid execution (if) monitored, the first layer of the loader only checks if it is being debugged, the same is achieved calling the good old isDebugPresent at offset 0x00403b7A.

Which, if it is the case, will lead to a fake message displayed to the user and simply stop executing.

At this stage, no additional anti-analysis checks are performed and the execution proceeds just flawless, passing control to the AutoIT code interpreter.

Layer 2

This sample in particular is not at all heavily obfuscated and many core functions still have a descriptive name (i.e. binder, startup, persistautoinject, […]).

Nevertheless, the overall code can be broken up in 3 blocks.

  1. top: naive obfuscation of some main native AutoIT functions + basic strings obfuscation function
  2. middle: core functionalities
  3. bottom: main execution logic

Let’s start from the bottom up; below the main steps executed at start

Function name Actions
enhkoxkvrufrsntgjkoyxiard removes the Zone.identifier of the file ([sample]:Zone.identifier), this will avoid Windows to inform the user about the execution of a not trusted file
mutex its a custom implementation (via Windows API calls -> Kernel32.dll -> CreateMutexW) for creating / checking mutex and to ensure that only one instance of the infection is running
_cryptedfile it chains together multiple functions, but in the end it reads one PE resource from the sample file and decrypts it, making it available to the next function (injector)
dnqmjpfdpcuxwbwkadcaibgzw RunPE injection function, leveraging shellcode for loading the final payload (in this case Darkcomet)
startup the persistency module, this will install a task executed via schtasks.exe and will run the sample every minute
ughotphdsufuiehfpoegoakmi another way of checking if the sample is running and calling the RunPE injection function on it

The middle part of the code stores many more functions than the one employed by this sample; something that aligns with the crypter builder opt-in / opt-out behavior.

Between those functions, some that are not used at least in this sample, but interesting are:

  • PersistAutoinject
  • Binder
  • UACBypass
  • USBSpreader
  • AntiVM


After some cleaning and functions rename, it is clearly visible how the payload is injected into RegAsm.exe.

Note that, $_cryptedfile stores the decrypted PE resource, which is the final payload carried by the crypter.


Depending on the arguments supplied to the function, the payload stored in the packer is appended to a clean file and afterwards started.

The merged files can be dropped into %temp%, %appadata% or the folder where the original file is running from.


Based on the OS version, two different types of UAC bypass tricks are run.

In case of Windows 7 or 8 via eventwer, and thanks to fodhelper for Windows 10.


It goes by itself what if does

  • Removable devices enumeration
    • For every device, folders are discovered
    • For every file - without extension .pif - the payload is copied into the folder and renamed with the original file name, adding extension .pif.
    • The original file is deleted


It boils down to three registry checks

  • Generic one
  • VMware specific
  • VirtualBox specific

Reaching finally the top part of the code, few calls stands immediately out from the crowd and looks good candidates or at least building blocks, for RunPE and many other direct OS calls.

  • DllStructSetData
  • DllStructGetSize
  • DllStructGetPtr
  • DllStructGetData
  • DllStructCreate
  • DllCall

For what concerns the strings obfuscation, once the function is cleaned up it looks like this

Deobfuscation routine calls are scattered around the script, but meaning of the strings is anyhow intuitive.

RunPE - Process Hollowing

Once the carried payload is read and decrypted (AES256) with a hardcoded password available in the script, the next steps can be outlined like in the diagram.

Bear in mind that the UPX part is an on/off feature and might not be enabled for other samples.

The shellcode, below just a small snippet, is embedded in the script and has its own function here renamed as RunPE, the whole body is hidden away thanks to the string obfuscation function uxharcuawtv.

Once extracted and converted in a suitable format, the first shellcode instructions are walking the PEB to resolve kernel32 and ntdll base addresses, later used for the respective API calls.

The shellcode is also using a basic hashing function instead of storing strings of the respective Windows APIs.

The function in charge for computing the hash is located @ 0x00000092

The assembly snippet can be easily translated to python.

win_apis = [

def build_hash(api):
    mapping = map(ord, api)
    uVar2 = 0
    for i in mapping:
        uVar2 = (uVar2 << 4) + i
        if (uVar2 & 0xF0000000):
            uVar2 = (uVar2 ^ (uVar2 & 0xf0000000) >> 0x18) & 0xfffffff

    return hex(uVar2)

for win_api in win_apis:

Once enumerated the exported functions from kernel32.dll and ntdll.dll, it becomes trivial to map the hash values found in the shellcode to their equivalent string versions - as seen at the beginning of the section.

0x73c3a79 ntdll.dll memcpy
0xb8a4a79 ntdll.dll RtlZeroMemory
0xc8338ee ntdll.dll NtUnmapViewOfSection
0x1e16457 kernel32.dll CreateProcessW
0x8cae418 kernel32.dll VirtualAllocEx
0x3d8cae3 kernel32.dll VirtualAlloc
0x648b099 kernel32.dll WriteProcessMemory
0x394ba93 kernel32.dll TerminateProcess
0x4b9c7e4 kernel32.dll GetThreadContext
0x4b887e4 kernel32.dll SetThreadContext
0x1d72da9 kernel32.dll ReadProcessMemory
0xb3dd105 kernel32.dll VirtualFree
0xf232744 kernel32.dll ResumeThread
0xd186fe8 kernel32.dll VirtualProtectEx

At the end, calling ResumeThread, resumes the suspended process - now filled with the payload - and break free the carried malware.

Quickly checking results on the internet for similar shellcode wrappers, yielded almost an identical version, the same was released on a forum in 2016, by a user that goes by the moniker of Wardow.

One hypothesis, if the previous catch holds true, is that CypherIT’s devs copy-paste, part of the wrapper / shellcode and embedded it straightaway into the crypter.

II - CypherIT

Looking at CypherIT website, its easy at least for some of the functions, to map 1:1 the advertised features with the code just analyzed

Note: screenshots taken around April 2019

The packer has different price entries, that goes from 30 up to 300 Euro, a part from that, support is also offered - surprisingly - 247 + Discord group too.

I guess the good old Skype, ICQ and Jabber days are gone ;-)

III - MalSilo historical memory

MalSilo works with multiple backends, some for storing metadata and others for the samples - but there are more supporting different uses cases.

Since the focus until now was on the crypter and not on the dropped payload, I though it might be also interesting to investigate which other families were dispatched during the campaigns.

Due to MalSilo project nature it has obviously a limited view about threats around the world, but it can still provide some insights; with this in mind let’s first get an idea about how many samples passed through the system.

This can be easily achieved querying MISP (backend #2) and organizing in a chronological order every collected samples.

The chart below shows a total of 49 specimens, out of curiosity the “patient zero” previously analyzed was detected on the 2018-11-28.

Since the steps for tracking a malware family are kind of unique due to they way MalSilo works, there is no much to share with the community, but the main points are:

  1. YARA rule is created for fingerprinting the crypter (note: at the time, the rule was covering only the version previously described, not the latest one)
  2. Backend #1, where samples are stored, is queried with the new rule + custom script is executed
  3. For every match, sample metadata is extracted from backend #2 (MISP)
  4. All samples are unpack un bulk mode
  5. For every sample
    1. The hard-coded password for the encrypted payload is gathered
    2. The carried payload is decrypted, extracted and saved to disk

Payloads are afterwards statically and dynamically fingerprinted. Dynamic checks are mandatory to overcome additional obfuscators or packers making static detection useless; the final results looks as follows.

PE resources

AutoIT provides an easy way to add custom resources to a file, this can be achieved via a specific User Defined Functions (UDF) known as #AutoIt3Wrapper_Res_File_Add.

The interesting part of this, is that it exposes the full path of the embedded resource, thus, exposing - for some samples - the Windows username of the threat actor crafting the payload.

Just keeping the first part of the Windows path, yields these names

  • c:\users\user
  • c:\users\robotmr
  • c:\users\lenovo pc
  • c:\users\hp
  • c:\users\bingoman-pc
  • w:\work\client and crypter
  • c:\users\administrator
  • c:\users\pondy
  • c:\users\peter kamau

Plotting the Windows paths taken from every payloads displays the following pattern

By looking at the graphs, it comes with no surprise that the packer was employed by off-the-shelf malware.

Out of curiosity, analyzing the crypters of the administrator user, which also crafted the payload investigated at the beginning of the article, it shows how all three samples were - most probably - generated by the same (old?) CypherIT version.

I say old, mostly because, if we look at the other samplings, its clearly visible how the overall script obfuscation technique was updated.

IV - Recent samples

The YARA rule originally developed reached its EOF - around 2019.02.11 - as soon as CypherIT received a major update.

Tearing a part a recent sample observed by MalSilo on the 2019.07.23 (7b252dbb6a39ea4814d29ebfd865f8a46a69dd9f) and also quickly skimming through some of the ones before (02.2019 - 07.2019) is clearly visible how the obfuscation technique - and not only - is more or less constantly updated.

From here we could start all over again :)

This last section will only investigate few functions, below some take aways.

  1. At run, the first instruction to be executed is a loop, with nested if statements, that initializes a set of variables
  2. A control variable, just set before the loop, decides which block should be jumped to next
  3. Close to the end of every if block, the control variable is re-initialized, defining the next jump to take
  4. Once a code block is executed, a custom function is resolved and called

  1. Afterwards, execution starts almost in the same way as the old version

Control Flow Flattening CFF , the steps just described, is employed almost in every functions, together with string obfuscation - this last one, sometimes with or without CFF.

When it comes to sandbox detection there are two new functions that comes into play

  • Detecting typical VM guest tools from, VirtualBox and VMware
  • Tracking mouse movement

AntiVM_moue_check snippet using CFF and strings obfuscation

AntiVM_moue_check after clean up


AntiVM_process_check after clean up

For what concerns the carried payload, latest versions stores it in multiple resources, under the RESOURCE_TYPE_FONTDIR, the function in charge of rebuilding it, is shown below.

The first function parameter, $data, takes in input a list of resources separated by | and rebuilds the final payload.


Nothing special to add about the shellcode, which for the few samples analyzed, remained the same.

Final thoughts

CypherIT did not perform any game changer new techniques; also after peeling all obfuscation layers, it keeps under the hood the same features observed back in 2018, adding to the portfolio new tricks and functionalities (not fully outlined in the last section).

Event if recent samples rely on CFF and new string obfuscation machination for slowing down analysis, some functions and related parameters are still talkative thanks to their naming convention.

If the earlier versions of the specimen were storing the payload only in one section of the PE file, latest ones split and store it in multiple resources, but in essence, the rebuilding technique stays the same as before.

In addition, since the code skeleton logic remained unchanged between updates, once new tricks are defeated, the analysis workflow can proceed more or less the same way as before.

Based on MalSilo telemetry data outlined in the article, it can be hypothesized that the crypter is mostly common among commodity malware of category stealers.


ATT&CK Techniques

Tactic ID Name
Persistance T1053 Scheduled Task
Persistance T1158 Hide Files and Directories
Privilege escalation T1088 Bypass User Account Control
Defense evasion T1093 Process Hollowing
Defense evasion T1055 Process Injection
Defense evasion T1045 Software Packing
Defense evasion T1027 Obfuscation Files or Information
Defense evasion T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

YARA rule

rule cypherit_shellcode
        author = "raw-data"
        tlp = "white"

        version = "1.0"
        created = "2019-01-25"
        modified = "2019-01-25"

        description = "Detects CypherIT shellcode"


        $win_api1 = { c7 8? ?? ?? ?? ?? ee 38 83 0c c7 8? ?? ?? ?? ?? 57 64 e1 01 c7 8? ?? ?? ?? ?? 18 e4 ca 08  }
        $win_api2 = { c7 8? ?? ?? ?? ?? e3 ca d8 03 c7 8? ?? ?? ?? ?? 99 b0 48 06  }

		$hashing_function = { 85 c9 74 20 0f be 07 c1 e6 04 03 f0 8b c6 25 00 00 00 f0 74 0b c1 e8 18 33 f0 81 e6 ff ff ff 0f 47 49  }

		(1 of ($win_api*)) and $hashing_function

MISP event


CypherIT samples and payload [08.2018 - 02.2019]


IOCs - 2019.07.23

Collection date Crypter (sha1) Drop site
2019-07-23 7b252dbb6a39ea4814d29ebfd865f8a46a69dd9f hXXp://mimiplace[.]top/invoice.exe

IOCs [08.2018 - 02.2019]

49 drop-sites and 44 unique samples

Collection date Crypter (sha1) Drop site
2018-08-28 bdf0f4184794a4e997004beefde7a29066e47847 hXXp://com2c.com[.]au/filehome/4hih
2018-09-03 55646431095967fc5d41d239de70a8ffbd8d0833 hXXp://service-information-fimance[.]bid/Java.exe
2018-09-03 823e2d3ef005d36b1401472dd5fd687a652b81b0 hXXp://service-information-fimance[.]bid/NETFramework.exe
2018-09-03 ec33f922fb324d7d2d4ee567ceba4563c6700661 hXXp://service-information-fimance[.]bid/AMADEUSapp.exe
2018-09-04 aed69a2e740e789139118e3753107f9d892790c7 hXXp://letmeplaywithyou[.]com/grace/bless.exe
2018-09-05 4f193f9724f8b37fe998f5d159ece8528f608fa9 hXXps://a.doko[.]moe/izgvrd
2018-09-05 aed69a2e740e789139118e3753107f9d892790c7 hXXps://letmeplaywithyou[.]com/grace/bless.exe
2018-09-07 ddf3a42a85fb4ae2fe5c86e7305265e8c46e52a9 hXXp://bit[.]ly/2Q6hlGD
2018-09-07 ddf3a42a85fb4ae2fe5c86e7305265e8c46e52a9 hXXps://b.coka[.]la/sxPC9O.jpg
2018-09-17 a81bc74373b5d948472e089877fa3b64c83c4fda hXXps://a.doko[.]moe/hpofbv
2018-09-19 e82e4a048cc66dfee9979a2db70e63b60a6aa3cb hXXp://lse-my[.]asia/servfbtmi.exe
2018-09-19 3fae31b10d8154edd1bfcca1c98cc3f61a78fdac hXXp://thepandasparadise[.]com/cts/dfgf/ExceI_Protected.exe
2018-09-19 5387c0ead3450eaef1cc82e4c4a0b52982fb2952 hXXp://thepandasparadise[.]com/cts/dfgf/dfdgfh/server_Pro.exe
2018-09-19 50a250aeb3c685e04cd2fce62634d1b95920cbab hXXp://scientificwebs[.]com/1.exe
2018-09-19 65b0e55170715d14ed139a7e1cd1710685e19a7d hXXps://scientificwebs[.]com/1.exe
2018-09-19 686e7c7e4767cc7198c71bc99596c226fbf1ab36 hXXp://thepandasparadise[.]com/cts/dfgf/win32_Pro.exe
2018-09-19 05fec020078b53643cb14a8ec7db3f2aa131e572 hXXp://thepandasparadise[.]com/cts/dfgf/dfdgfh/win32_Pro.exe
2018-09-19 1adc1f7d7fd258a75c835efd1210aa2e159636aa hXXp://thepandasparadise[.]com/cts/ExceI_Protected.exe
2018-09-19 bbcd6a0a7f73ec06d2fab527f418fca6d05af3a6 hXXp://lse-my[.]asia/dotvmptee.exe
2018-09-19 a5944808c302944b5906d892a1fd77adaf4a309c hXXp://thepandasparadise[.]com/cts/dfgf/dfdgfh/fgbh/server_Pro.exe
2018-09-19 90d6f6bb6879862cb8d8da90c99cb764f064bc5a hXXp://thepandasparadise[.]com/cts/dfgf/winRAR1.exe
2018-09-20 50a250aeb3c685e04cd2fce62634d1b95920cbab hXXps://scientificwebs[.]com/1.exe
2018-09-20 a9856ca5ecba168cc5ebe39c3a04cb0c0b432466 hXXp://scientificwebs[.]com/1.exe
2018-09-21 7d2cddf145941456c7f89eb0ecbbaabb1eb4ef0a hXXps://b.coka[.]la/E5CoMb.jpg
2018-09-21 767945f40c2de439c5107456e34f014149da16e6 hXXp://lse-my[.]asia/servfbtmi.exe
2018-09-21 6a41eb6dbfe98444f126d42b1b5818767ced508d hXXp://lse-my[.]asia/servfbtmi.exe
2018-09-21 a9856ca5ecba168cc5ebe39c3a04cb0c0b432466 hXXps://scientificwebs[.]com/1.exe
2018-09-25 6e75dc48ec0380e189f67ba7f61aff99f5d68a04 hXXp://b.coka[.]la/sMZD0n.jpg
2018-09-25 3e5bef4eaf3975de6573a2fd22ce66ad6c88c652 hXXps://b.coka[.]la/E19F0D.jpg
2018-09-25 50c2b8ac2d8f04a172538abaa00bcb5dc135bb12 hXXp://b.coka[.]la/ZKW6B.jpg
2018-09-27 96136f00f59a44c2bce10755bcced5c362868766 hXXp://lse-my[.]asia/stbincrp.exe
2018-09-27 b199f2488849b3bcad92e85190d2525422b1a644 hXXps://share.dmca[.]gripe/FxJ0r9YOSecgw9FP
2018-09-28 8973591f584f2b104559cc5bc73838ff0df0e50f hXXp://lse-my[.]asia/injclientcrp.exe
2018-09-28 03469616ce1ce960edbc6be814ca3ab86902067d hXXp://lse-my[.]asia/stbincrp.exe
2018-09-28 2ef17bc8b67f17fb5957c8edc969aa5bdcc1c76e hXXp://lse-my[.]asia/goosmi.exe
2018-09-28 6bdad0aae469313a8567ad1138a744dca74f1ecc hXXp://lse-my[.]asia/pacbellcrp.exe
2018-11-08 b12dda5c58fd6f6c83921007e14984f29f85f768 hXXp://77.73.68[.]110/ftp92131/nj2.dat
2018-11-08 ab2047929be29957da14dc9114009b149fd8c6b2 hXXp://77.73.68[.]110/bullet967/ORDER883847777384pdf.exe
2018-11-08 8deb9352d11ed1057209fc572f401d83ad548b27 hXXp://77.73.68[.]110/ftp92131/q2.dat
2018-11-08 011e58cee3757035ca531b85b9cb9e3680a73ed5 hXXp://77.73.68[.]110/ftp92131/q1.dat
2018-11-08 0fd9c8c5c1275a0b9c6418bf55fe48bff4c56264 hXXps://e.coka[.]la/g3iTRU
2018-11-08 06f327a1e115f3e1b42ffbcedc235d9c2f8a7811 hXXp://77.73.68[.]110/ftp92131/nj1.dat
2018-11-10 a293b6868a0b82621e94be1266d09c49f1ff7e0b hXXps://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws[.]com/qued/faxbyjeny33.exe
2018-11-28 4448b907f2c9f9ee8e4b13e4b6c292eef4b70930 hXXps://f.coka[.]la/K2bkm.jpg
2018-11-30 1625aa77ed24ed9d052a0153e1939b5a32b352ed hXXps://e.coka[.]la/GRVzbl.jpg
2018-12-07 43fd77d2401618f8cc0a7ae63bc6bd5e52630498 hXXps://doc-00-5k-docs.googleusercontent[.]com/docs/securesc/ha0ro937gcuc7l7deffksulhg5h7mbp1/rbdpoatvh5pc64k1st3d1atb7tcurkfh/1544212800000/11570855783461912856/*/15nlC5g9fvaX4VvpyZY-0L_HaSf5BpBaI?e=download
2019-02-11 6e75dc48ec0380e189f67ba7f61aff99f5d68a04 hXXps://b.coka[.]la/sMZD0n.jpg
2019-02-11 4c098028fa92129f9a40fb5f7fa3f3e60f9e2885 hXXps://b.coka[.]la/KMjalT.jpg
2019-02-11 68dcb96a0f096dc9846bf8bd3a41eb6b1fc764b2 hXXps://e.coka[.]la/BGZeW

Mapping between crypter and delivered payload

Crypter (sha1) Payload (sha1) Malware family payload
3fae31b10d8154edd1bfcca1c98cc3f61a78fdac b5d8fbe61e16c7d41d1d2b8ecb05db3f26328bad Generic-VBA-Injector
ec33f922fb324d7d2d4ee567ceba4563c6700661 b3b657d98212f654d787958940f2a9d47bfbea7e CyberGate/Rebhip
2ef17bc8b67f17fb5957c8edc969aa5bdcc1c76e 0ce26d4c9785c0bcdb617eaa5e5112f61704f00e Formbook
6a41eb6dbfe98444f126d42b1b5818767ced508d 035fa7cf96bf30c6f0aae990d9b03123a8d9147e Formbook
a9856ca5ecba168cc5ebe39c3a04cb0c0b432466 4fa9093716ae217a7c584d5fec6451284f99ae34 AgentTesla
50a250aeb3c685e04cd2fce62634d1b95920cbab 4fa9093716ae217a7c584d5fec6451284f99ae34 AgentTesla
68dcb96a0f096dc9846bf8bd3a41eb6b1fc764b2 7448566a87b0037c4826902353fffb5f572f7eae Remcos
55646431095967fc5d41d239de70a8ffbd8d0833 283d515db413c371d956568a2c80a18a2c6cff25 NanoCore
65b0e55170715d14ed139a7e1cd1710685e19a7d 4fa9093716ae217a7c584d5fec6451284f99ae34 AgentTesla
1625aa77ed24ed9d052a0153e1939b5a32b352ed 9ebef7e7a264cba868b0faeb7f34f5a5417cea36 Remcos
b199f2488849b3bcad92e85190d2525422b1a644 397f6f2bf9d5498c215662c164fe05f8090272cf Remcos
4f193f9724f8b37fe998f5d159ece8528f608fa9 f023cb03312770264fc71716c343a7f99ba77b37 AgentTesla
8deb9352d11ed1057209fc572f401d83ad548b27 2af16eb4711043e520369a3f27c97a80094df6ce QuasarRAT
5387c0ead3450eaef1cc82e4c4a0b52982fb2952 eaa912026092a81b42cfe1c51eba01132a051dd3 Generic-VBA-Injector
8973591f584f2b104559cc5bc73838ff0df0e50f b552cbb2b1a536ae1aa97dcdb68270036126931e Formbook
3e5bef4eaf3975de6573a2fd22ce66ad6c88c652 405dd0cf8527da5c586fa26b66ddcfad39febd61 AgentTesla
4448b907f2c9f9ee8e4b13e4b6c292eef4b70930 587bb64894c3bc5e46cfda3b777224f88a0b17f9 DarkComet
e82e4a048cc66dfee9979a2db70e63b60a6aa3cb 035fa7cf96bf30c6f0aae990d9b03123a8d9147e Formbook
0fd9c8c5c1275a0b9c6418bf55fe48bff4c56264 9567a636928edfa5c22d4c5fa761c38bcc6823a9 Remcos
4c098028fa92129f9a40fb5f7fa3f3e60f9e2885 af6cab774984d53451609bd26088309172737f89 AgentTesla
ab2047929be29957da14dc9114009b149fd8c6b2 8600cfa7fab36533ca02215202aefd7c68ecba9b Imminent
6e75dc48ec0380e189f67ba7f61aff99f5d68a04 f59755e9fa01362a9bc63f3e8da944eb3d3da3c4 AgentTesla
ddf3a42a85fb4ae2fe5c86e7305265e8c46e52a9 405dd0cf8527da5c586fa26b66ddcfad39febd61 AgentTesla
90d6f6bb6879862cb8d8da90c99cb764f064bc5a eaa912026092a81b42cfe1c51eba01132a051dd3 Generic-VBA-Injector
a293b6868a0b82621e94be1266d09c49f1ff7e0b cb24de30895442cf327d3947edd56be6503e2b13 Imminent
bdf0f4184794a4e997004beefde7a29066e47847 f023cb03312770264fc71716c343a7f99ba77b37 AgentTesla
b12dda5c58fd6f6c83921007e14984f29f85f768 0eeca43abeced0650d941ad8515bd744fa4176ed NjRAT
a5944808c302944b5906d892a1fd77adaf4a309c eaa912026092a81b42cfe1c51eba01132a051dd3 Generic-VBA-Injector
bbcd6a0a7f73ec06d2fab527f418fca6d05af3a6 17159c39c4ee765291035bbf5687dafeeb1bd380 Formbook
1adc1f7d7fd258a75c835efd1210aa2e159636aa b5d8fbe61e16c7d41d1d2b8ecb05db3f26328bad Generic-VBA-Injector
011e58cee3757035ca531b85b9cb9e3680a73ed5 6cd247e6d37d43a64741cb1e57efba96785d4c84 QuasarRAT
50c2b8ac2d8f04a172538abaa00bcb5dc135bb12 f13046e41b10d376a938cf60b29943459b58ee8a AgentTesla
6bdad0aae469313a8567ad1138a744dca74f1ecc d4ddf2da16dc503c3d14178caa84f993467e3fcd Formbook
823e2d3ef005d36b1401472dd5fd687a652b81b0 a2370c663e234d0f6a8a96c74cc7b4a28bdbcc71 Imminent
7d2cddf145941456c7f89eb0ecbbaabb1eb4ef0a 405dd0cf8527da5c586fa26b66ddcfad39febd61 AgentTesla
686e7c7e4767cc7198c71bc99596c226fbf1ab36 0de1d77d61f8a0132f1b6663351023e6b485615f NanoCore
03469616ce1ce960edbc6be814ca3ab86902067d 98f113a9d54688f7eec645855057a0910f1ebbf6 Azorult
aed69a2e740e789139118e3753107f9d892790c7 d5c7f3642d61a5297536e9aa0c4c3af9099cb247 Andromeda
05fec020078b53643cb14a8ec7db3f2aa131e572 0de1d77d61f8a0132f1b6663351023e6b485615f NanoCore
43fd77d2401618f8cc0a7ae63bc6bd5e52630498 f8c78342b9585588ec7a028e9581a93aeacb9747 NjRAT
06f327a1e115f3e1b42ffbcedc235d9c2f8a7811 945cdc67c1eb8fc027475a193ba206cf7ecd40b4 NjRAT
a81bc74373b5d948472e089877fa3b64c83c4fda 4d458a0b27e58ab7cf930c2ff55bfe4f083aa52d Remcos

Mapping between Windows user path and delivered payload

Crypter (sha1) Payload resource location Malware family payload
3fae31b10d8154edd1bfcca1c98cc3f61a78fdac c:\users\user\desktop\update\kuppq\yrjuhhjhai Generic-VBA-Injector
ec33f922fb324d7d2d4ee567ceba4563c6700661 c:\users\robotmr\desktop\cipherit\sirlv\orzrfpubgq CyberGate/Rebhip
2ef17bc8b67f17fb5957c8edc969aa5bdcc1c76e c:\users\user\desktop\cypherit\kvmsr\sylgrnaoja Formbook
6a41eb6dbfe98444f126d42b1b5818767ced508d c:\users\user\desktop\cypherit\kxiav\vyuvenhftx Formbook
a9856ca5ecba168cc5ebe39c3a04cb0c0b432466 c:\users\lenovo pc\documents\cypherit\dbcfr\evzthiwzwv AgentTesla
50a250aeb3c685e04cd2fce62634d1b95920cbab c:\users\lenovo pc\documents\cypherit\afwuh\pakfxtjjtr AgentTesla
68dcb96a0f096dc9846bf8bd3a41eb6b1fc764b2 c:\users\hp\desktop\cypherit\feung\aegmywmuhw Remcos
55646431095967fc5d41d239de70a8ffbd8d0833 c:\users\robotmr\desktop\cipherit\jkvkh\povdgmqwwf NanoCore
65b0e55170715d14ed139a7e1cd1710685e19a7d c:\users\lenovo pc\documents\cypherit\tsdsn\owkywxlpuo AgentTesla
1625aa77ed24ed9d052a0153e1939b5a32b352ed c:\users\hp\desktop\cypherit\jmtby\vtlfqlhyjd Remcos
b199f2488849b3bcad92e85190d2525422b1a644 c:\users\hp\desktop\cypherit\zfmal\tenkocitdk Remcos
4f193f9724f8b37fe998f5d159ece8528f608fa9 c:\users\bingoman-pc\downloads\update\skcha\zaqwzrhyrj AgentTesla
8deb9352d11ed1057209fc572f401d83ad548b27 w:\work\client and crypter\crypters\cypherit\upjzw\crccbblvqr QuasarRAT
5387c0ead3450eaef1cc82e4c4a0b52982fb2952 c:\users\user\desktop\update\sldmr\sjmaqkecsw Generic-VBA-Injector
8973591f584f2b104559cc5bc73838ff0df0e50f c:\users\user\desktop\cypherit\cnbvs\detwldamdu Formbook
3e5bef4eaf3975de6573a2fd22ce66ad6c88c652 c:\users\bingoman-pc\downloads\update\qdpsr\xgvtxjugvj AgentTesla
4448b907f2c9f9ee8e4b13e4b6c292eef4b70930 c:\users\administrator\desktop\cypherit\fvtit\lhoqctjmjo DarkComet
e82e4a048cc66dfee9979a2db70e63b60a6aa3cb c:\users\user\desktop\cypherit\nnxsi\cuzgxaenow Formbook
0fd9c8c5c1275a0b9c6418bf55fe48bff4c56264 c:\users\hp\desktop\cypherit\tjkxp\hoilettosu Remcos
4c098028fa92129f9a40fb5f7fa3f3e60f9e2885 c:\users\bingoman-pc\downloads\update\blcmk\mspmisscix AgentTesla
ab2047929be29957da14dc9114009b149fd8c6b2 c:\users\pondy\desktop\cypherit\jfdvd\bhbwgnhlpt Imminent
6e75dc48ec0380e189f67ba7f61aff99f5d68a04 c:\users\bingoman-pc\downloads\update\qdpsr\nsskftnenb AgentTesla
ddf3a42a85fb4ae2fe5c86e7305265e8c46e52a9 c:\users\bingoman-pc\downloads\update\skcha\iljxbfjwjz AgentTesla
90d6f6bb6879862cb8d8da90c99cb764f064bc5a c:\users\user\desktop\update\usbad\lrmrmblvxz Generic-VBA-Injector
a293b6868a0b82621e94be1266d09c49f1ff7e0b c:\users\administrator\desktop\cypherit\zajlq\torabywgww Imminent
bdf0f4184794a4e997004beefde7a29066e47847 c:\users\bingoman-pc\downloads\update\xmhea\fezrqknxti AgentTesla
b12dda5c58fd6f6c83921007e14984f29f85f768 w:\work\client and crypter\crypters\cypherit\upjzw\fuwikvopxn NjRAT
a5944808c302944b5906d892a1fd77adaf4a309c c:\users\user\desktop\update\rotre\xmdklwilso Generic-VBA-Injector
bbcd6a0a7f73ec06d2fab527f418fca6d05af3a6 c:\users\user\desktop\cypherit\nnxsi\mswdkgevxa Formbook
1adc1f7d7fd258a75c835efd1210aa2e159636aa c:\users\user\desktop\update\zoddm\ocidiuboxz Generic-VBA-Injector
011e58cee3757035ca531b85b9cb9e3680a73ed5 w:\work\client and crypter\crypters\cypherit\upjzw\hmalcrldse QuasarRAT
50c2b8ac2d8f04a172538abaa00bcb5dc135bb12 c:\users\bingoman-pc\downloads\update\nhupn\lbddirvobk AgentTesla
6bdad0aae469313a8567ad1138a744dca74f1ecc c:\users\user\desktop\cypherit\cnbvs\utrjwnkjsd Formbook
823e2d3ef005d36b1401472dd5fd687a652b81b0 c:\users\robotmr\desktop\cipherit\xiwpy\ztcitplyof Imminent
7d2cddf145941456c7f89eb0ecbbaabb1eb4ef0a c:\users\bingoman-pc\downloads\update\roqli\kfkldukcus AgentTesla
686e7c7e4767cc7198c71bc99596c226fbf1ab36 c:\users\user\desktop\update\fteyl\enudngaemy NanoCore
03469616ce1ce960edbc6be814ca3ab86902067d c:\users\user\desktop\cypherit\cnbvs\keafqrogtw Azorult
aed69a2e740e789139118e3753107f9d892790c7 c:\users\administrator\desktop\cyperit\hkmzn\hwgracgvjt Andromeda
05fec020078b53643cb14a8ec7db3f2aa131e572 c:\users\user\desktop\update\drweo\distzbbkvx NanoCore
43fd77d2401618f8cc0a7ae63bc6bd5e52630498 c:\users\peter kamau\desktop\cypher\dzncz\gxrqkcdtpc NjRAT
06f327a1e115f3e1b42ffbcedc235d9c2f8a7811 w:\work\client and crypter\crypters\cypherit\upjzw\gkviexpzpl NjRAT
a81bc74373b5d948472e089877fa3b64c83c4fda c:\users\hp\desktop\cypherit\hxnfr\gzlyqzcgpj Remcos